Masomo yaliyojifunza kupitia ukaguzi wa nje wa uwajibikaji wa mazingira na kijamii wa IFC

Katika kipindi cha miaka 10 iliyopita, Mshauri wa Utekelezaji Ombudsman (CAO) amepokea malalamiko ya 231 yanayohusiana na miradi ya Shirika la Fedha la Kimataifa (IFC) na Shirika la Dhamana ya Uwekezaji wa Multilateral (MIGA), silaha mbili za sekta binafsi za Kundi la Benki ya Dunia. Kati ya malalamiko haya 231, chini ya nusu yametangazwa kuwa yanastahiki (115) na kupitia utatuzi wa migogoro au ukaguzi wa kufuata, njia mbili zinazopatikana kwa ajili ya usindikaji wa malalamiko. Mchakato wake wa utatuzi wa mizozo umefanikiwa kwa kiasi fulani, na karibu asilimia 75 ya kesi zinafikia azimio la sehemu au kamili. Kazi yake ya kufuata, kwa upande mwingine, imekuwa chini ya mafanikio, hasa kuhusiana na uwezo wake wa kutoa dawa kwa watu walioathirika na mradi walioathirika na IFC au MIGA ya kutofuata. Katika asilimia 13 tu ya kesi zilipatikana kuwa hatua za kurekebisha zilionekana kuwa za kutosha kuleta mradi huo katika kufuata, wakati katika asilimia 87 ya kesi, vitendo vilionekana kuwa vya kuridhisha au visivyoridhisha.

Ni nyuma ya matokeo haya kwamba kumekuwa na ukaguzi wa nje wa CAO, haswa kazi yake ya kufuata, na uwajibikaji wa mazingira na kijamii wa IFC na MIGA (E&S). Huu ni ukaguzi wa nne katika historia ya CAO, na uliopita uliofanywa katika 2003, 2006, na 2010. Aina hizi za hakiki ni moja wapo ya njia muhimu ambazo Mifumo yote ya Uwajibikaji wa Kujitegemea (IAMs), ambayo CAO ni moja tu, kuboresha, kukabiliana na kukua kama taasisi zao na mazoea bora yanaendelea. Pia ni njia muhimu ambayo IAMs, kama taasisi za kujitegemea, zinajumuisha maoni ya nje.

Mapitio haya ya hivi karibuni yalianzishwa mnamo Juni 2019 kwa ombi la Bodi za IFC na MIGA, kushughulikia baadhi ya wasiwasi ulioibuliwa hapo juu. Hizi ziliongezeka zaidi na kile kinachoelezewa kama "kuongeza hatari za madai zinazokabiliwa na IFC", ikitaja kesi ya hivi karibuni, iliyotangazwa sana dhidi yake (Jam vs IFC).

Mapitio hayo yalifanywa na kikundi cha wataalam sita wa kujitegemea, wa nje ambao walipewa jukumu la kutoa mapendekezo juu ya mpangilio wa utawala wa CAO, jukumu na ufanisi; athari ambazo michakato ya sasa ya CAO ina kwa wadau; mwitikio wa IFC na MIGA kwa wasiwasi kuhusu athari mbaya; matumizi ya kujifunza kutoka kwa kazi ya CAO katika ngazi ya sera za IFC na MIGA; na haja ya kuendeleza mifumo ya malalamiko ndani ya Usimamizi wa IFC / MIGA.

Mapendekezo ya Mapitio ya Nje
Kufuatia mchakato wao wa ukaguzi wa miezi 10, seti ifuatayo ya mapendekezo yaliyoelekezwa kwa IFC / MIGA na CAO yalizalishwa.

Mapendekezo ya IFC / MIGA:

• kuongoza katika kuhakikisha na kukuza uendelevu katika sekta binafsi
• kufafanua uwajibikaji wa E&S kwa waamuzi wa kifedha na kuhakikisha utendaji wao wa E&S
• kuimarisha uwezo, mifumo, na mawazo ya shirika kushughulikia wasiwasi na malalamiko kutoka kwa watu walioathirika
• kujenga utamaduni wa majibu ya kazi zaidi na nia kubwa ya kushirikiana na wateja na walalamikaji
• kutambua kuwa CAO yenye ufanisi ni sehemu muhimu ya uwajibikaji wa IFC / MIGA wa E&S
• kuanzisha mfumo wa IFC / MIGA kwa hatua za kurekebisha katika kesi ambazo kutofuata kunachangia madhara

Mapendekezo ya CAO:

• kurekebisha muundo wa taarifa ili CAO inaripoti kwa Bodi (kwa sasa CAO inaripoti kwa Rais wa Kundi la Benki ya Dunia)  
• muda mfupi wa utunzaji wa malalamiko (kwa wastani ukaguzi wa kufuata huchukua zaidi ya miaka 3)
• kuimarisha juhudi za kutafuta ufumbuzi wa mapema wa malalamiko
• kuongeza hatua za kumlinda mteja na kutoa IFC / MIGA sauti rasmi mapema katika mchakato wa kufuata
• kuunda sera mpya, iliyoidhinishwa na bodi na kurekebisha miongozo ya uendeshaji ya CAO

While this process and the findings it produced were directed at IFC/MIGA and the CAO, there is huge value in other international financial institutions (IFIs) and IAMs examining these findings and their broader relevance to the field of accountability in development finance. This includes for the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Independent Redress Mechanism (IRM), particularly due to the similarities in the funding models, including the use of financial intermediaries, and E&S policies and standards of the GCF and IFC.

Financial Intermediation
One of the key findings regarding the funding structure, was the uncertainty created by financial intermediaries, entities that act as middlemen to on-lend or invest in sub-projects. The review found that there is currently insufficient clarity on how its E&S policies apply to sub-projects and significant gaps in the IFC’s ability to ensure that its financial intermediary clients are adequately assessing E&S risks and ensuring the application of the IFC’s Performance Standards. In addition, the complexity associated with financial intermediaries also creates challenges for the CAO’s functioning, both for affected stakeholders to access the CAO as well as for determining whether incoming complaints are eligible.

Therefore, the review recommended that the IFC further clarify how it will assure itself of the E&S performance of its financial intermediaries, strengthen its due diligence and supervision of financial intermediary clients and enhance the transparency of IFC-funded portfolios and sub-projects. These recommendations are very relevant to the GCF, which also channels a substantial proportion of its funding through financial intermediaries. In addition to the complexity of channeling its project finance through financial intermediaries, the GCF’s portfolio also includes ‘programmes’, which are funded activities with overarching goals and themes, which are made up of sub-projects usually spanning across several countries. These sub-projects are not, as yet, disclosed on the GCF website and are not required to be individually approved by the GCF Board, but are rather identified subsequently according to a broad set of eligibility criteria. These layers in the financing structure of the GCF are worth examining in the light of the issues faced by the IFC. 

Remediation of Harm
One of the most significant recommendations was the need for improved systems for providing remedy to affected people. This remains one of the weakest points across the board for IAMs where even with findings of non-compliance, affected people are often left with no or inadequate remedy. The review recommended the establishment of a ‘remedial action framework’, a clearly defined structure and process for how remedy should be provided if required. Firstly, it recommended that there should be a requirement for all IFC clients to create a means of funding remedy should it be required. These could be in the form of insurance, performance bonds, or contingency reserves which can be accessed or triggered where needed. And secondly, it recommended that the Board should agree to the principle that where IFC/MIGA itself has contributed to harm, it should be required to also contribute to remedy, including in the form of financial compensation where needed. This could be made possible through the establishment of a remedy fund to meet these commitments.

Relations between CAO and IFC Management
Lastly, the review emphasized the importance of ensuring good relations between the management of IFC/MIGA and its accountability mechanism, the CAO. The review noted that while some level of tension is likely to occur when the CAO investigates compliance of the IFC/MIGA, they found that their disagreements have led to “polarized attitudes and unconstructive interactions”. These disagreements have in some cases impeded the flow of information, delayed processes, undermined potential corrective actions, and limited the utility of some compliance reviews to act as an opportunity to learn from difficult cases. The review, therefore, proposed that current CAO processes (including IFC/MIGA roles and responses) be adjusted to promote a more collaborative relationship. This is a finding that all IFIs and respective IAMs should take note of. Promoting a collaborative relationship which enhances the outcomes of IAM processes, while still maintaining the IAMs independence and objectivity, will facilitate greater access to remedy for affected people.

IRM’s Learning and Dialogue Forum
In order to share these lessons both within the GCF and IRM, the IRM hosted an inreach event on 13 October 2020 where Professor Arntraud Hartmann, one of the external reviewers, presented these findings to the GCF Secretariat and independent unit staff. This was followed by a brief commentary by the Head of the IRM, Dr Lalanath de Silva, on the similarities and differences between the two institutions, and what we as the GCF and IRM may learn from these findings. The virtual event was attended by approximately 40 staff, many of whom contributed to the debate with interesting questions and insights.

This review has been extremely significant for the accountability world in its scope and depth. Here at the IRM we hope that these findings will have positive consequences across IAMs and IFIs, including within our own institution. The IFC and CAO are forerunners in the development finance accountability space, with a wealth of data and experience. It is essential that we foster dialogue and learning within and between institutions, to accelerate our growth and effectiveness.
 
Article prepared by Katrina Lehmann-Grube and Christine Reddell